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Communicating climate change: conduits, content, and 
consensus 
 
 
Abstract  
Climate change has been the subject of increasing scientific efforts and growing interest 
from policymakers, international bodies and a variety of non-government organizations. The 
past decade has seen climate change in the headlines not only in conventional print and 
broadcast media but also in new electronic social fora. These developments have been 
aligned with shifts in the nature of climate change communication and with changes in how 
researchers study it and how a variety of actors try to influence it. This article situates the 
theory and practice of climate change communication within developments that have taken 
place since we first reviewed the field in 2009. These include the rise of new communication 
technologies, the development of new theories of science/climate communication, and the 
emergence of new climate communication practices. We focus in particular on continuing 
tensions between the desire on the part of communicators to inform the public and 
alternative strategies such as engaging stakeholders in dialogue. We also consider the 
tension between efforts to promote the idea of a consensus in climate science versus 
approaches that attempt to engage with uncertainty more fully. Throughout the article we 
explore the value of more participatory models of climate change communication that 
exploit, rather than shun, residual uncertainties in climate science in order to stimulate 
debate and deliberation.  
 Introduction 
We drafted a first version of this article in 20091 in the midst of events such as the failure of 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen 
in 2009 (Conference of the Parties 15), Climategate2-6, numerous other ͚-ŐĂƚĞ͛ affairs 7-9, and 
repercussions from a global recession which shifted ordinary ƉĞŽƉůĞ͛Ɛ attention and 
priorities from saving the planet to saving money. Around 2009 there was hope that ͚ďĞƚƚĞƌ͛ 
climate change communication would increasingly and relatively straightforwardly lead to 
better global and local climate change policies and a popular uptake of such policies. Such 
hopes have been dented in the intervening years and public interest in climate change has 
dwindled, at least as measured through trends for search terms on Google10.  
At the same time a different trend has emerged in scholarly attention to ͚ĐůŝŵĂƚĞ change 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ͛͘ Here one can observe an upward trend that accelerated after 2010 when 
our article was published. According to the Scopus database, as of May 2015, 311 articles 
have been published on ͚ĐůŝŵĂƚĞ change ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ͕͛ with the most ͚ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ͛ being our 
2010 article entitled ͚dŚĞŽƌǇ and language of climate ĐŚĂŶŐĞ͛ (cited 42 times on Scopus, 78 
times on Google Scholar). 235 articles have appeared on the topic since the beginning of 
2010. In this second edition of the article we do not attempt to review all these new articles, 
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especially since searching Scopus for ͚ĐůŝŵĂƚĞ change ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ͛ does not necessarily 
capture all articles on the topic and not at all more practical climate change communication 
activities. Instead, we have used three criteria to guide our decision on which literature to 
cover in this new review. First, we have sought to accommodate some of the developments 
in the subject area itself, for example the legacy of Climategate and how scientists, activists 
and communicators are addressing the so-called ͚ƉĂƵƐĞ͛ or ͚ƐůŽǁĚŽǁŶ͛ in the predicted rise 
in surface and tropospheric temperatures. Second, we have sought to address the rise of 
social media such as Twitter. Third, we develop our 2010 critique of the transmission models 
of climate change communication via a critical review of the recent project to emphasise 
scientific consensus as a persuasive device in climate communication. Recently this has been 
a particularly prominent aspect of the approach concerned with providing the public with 
more information.  
Therefore, a theme running through this paper is the tension between the classical idea in 
science communication that the public is uninformed and needs educating versus the 
paradigm that promotes the idea of engagement and critical, inclusive dialogue. When we 
were writing the original piece in 2009, a good deal of the effort made to communicate 
about climate change involved trying to find an optimum way of framing and wording 
messages so that the public would absorb them. Whilst a number of initiatives still proceed 
in this way, the growing presence of discussions of climate in new media and the spread of 
opportunities for interaction via these new platforms has provided researchers with novel 
ways of making sense of how climate change is collectively formulated, and, possibly, acted 
upon. Accordingly, it is timely to critically examine the work on this subject and assess the 
progress of different ways of thinking about scientist and activist warnings of climate change 
and their audiences in the broader public and in policymaking circles.  
Finally, a further theme in our discussion concerns how climate change communication 
addresses the question of uncertainty. This is inherent in the differing levels of certainty the 
IPCC attaches to its conclusions and the calibrated language it uses to convey these to the 
wider public and policy makers11, as well as in the predictions of activists and 
communicators in the public sphere. There is a further tension in views about how 
uncertainty should be managed in a context where some try to minimize, or indeed 
maximize, uncertainty in public pronouncements, while others wish to accommodate a 
degree of uncertainty in climate dialogue. These tensions inform how the public is conceived 
and addressed, the kinds of communication that are deemed most desirable, and even the 
nature of messages themselves. In the following we first provide an overview of emerging 
trends in climate change communication and then home in on the themes of consensus and 
uncertainty. Some of what follows is based on current research undertaken by the authors, 
but most of this article is what one might call a critical, and necessarily selective, meta-
analysis of recent work on climate change communication. 
 
New contexts for climate change communication 
After 2009, a period of soul-searching began about the nature of climate science, especially 
relating to issues of openness and transparency12, about the boundaries between science, 
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politics and advocacy 13, 14 and about the politicisation and polarisation of the climate change 
debate 15, 16. The emergence of social media brought with it some hope of more democratic 
debates 11, although opening up public spaces for debate has brought opportunities for 
incivility as well as deliberation 17. In the process, the role of climate change communication 
in this treacherous science-politics landscape has come under increased scrutiny, with 
fundamental disagreements over whether it can be possible to communicate climate science 
in an apolitical way 18, 19.  
In this context, a new science of science communication, of which climate change 
communication is a part, has emerged, informed by an increasing number of psychological 
studies trying to understand deep-rooted tensions that still characterise climate change 
debates and public attitudes to climate change. Alongside new theories, new practices of 
climate change communication rooted in some of these theories have been promoted (for 
an overview of this burgeoning literature, see Wibeck 20), as well as new communication 
strategies such as consensus messaging.  
In the following, we first summarize some older and newer results derived from analyses of 
traditional media coverage of climate change, followed by newer and ongoing research into 
online debates on climate change. We then present a brief summary of some psychological 
studies of climate change communication which have been carried out alongside extensive 
surveys of public attitudes, which fed into new theories of science and climate change 
communication and influenced practical climate change messaging and outreach activities. 
Climate change communication: Theory, practice and controversy 
Traditional media 
While traditional media analysis is still a buoyant subfield within climate change 
communication research, online media analysis has begun to attract increasing scholarly 
attention 21. We first summarize some recent contributions to the older field of study 
dealing with traditional media and then turn our attention to the newer field dealing with 
climate change debates in the social media. 
In 2014 22, a meta-analysis of 133 studies of the role of media in climate change 
communication showed that research activity had increased in quantity and broadened in 
scope, including more countries, more types of media, and different methodological 
approaches. Within this burgeoning literature, Western countries and print media continued 
to be the dominant research topics 22 , although broader, international analyses are now 
beginning to appear. For example, a comparison between 27 countries showed that climate 
change coverage increased in all countries between 1996 and 2010, although there were 
significant differences between countries in the extent of growth and media attention 23. 
However, since this period there have been signs of reversal in these trends as late 2009 
marked a peak in print media coverage of climate change, with both the Copenhagen 
summit and Climategate prompting large number of stories 21. The big picture has been of 
declining media interest since these events 24 although there have been recent spikes in 
interest, especially around extreme weather events, IPCC reports and new developments in 
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climate policy and politics 21. This suggests that the Paris climate summit in late 2015 
(Conference of the Parties 21) may see a significant increase in media attention. 
Since 2010, country specific and comparative studies of media coverage have flourished25, 
with one international study showing that political advocates for climate policy have been 
far more visible in media articles than skeptical voices 26. Another study found that while in 
most UK newspaper climate change is accepted as a problem and political solutions to 
addressing it are being discussed, some newspapers in the U.S. still discuss whether climate 
change is a scientific problem or not25.  
This provides an insight into how climate change has become an increasingly politicized 
subject since its arrival on the public agenda in 1988 27. For example, a content analysis of 
articles published in the New York Times 28 found ͞Ă gradual decline in the volume of 
material within the ͚^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ͛ topic and an expansion of themes classified under the ͚WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ͛ 
ƚŽƉŝĐ͟ between 1995 and 2010. After 2010 there was an increase in discussions around 
mitigation technologies from carbon capture and storage to fracking, alongside a hope that 
new types of technologies such as fracking, might allow a breathing space for thinking about 
future ways of reducing carbon emissions 29, 30 . Allied to this, there have been a number of 
detailed studies of the metaphorical framing and social representations of climate-related 
issues such as geoengineering 31, carbon capture and storage 32 and fracking 33-35. Ongoing 
attempts to overcome the abstract nature of scientific knowledge have also led the study of 
visualization 36 and press conferences 37 to emerge as sub-fields of climate change 
communication research.  
Such moves from abstract science to the material mitigation (and increasingly adaptation) 
involve complex interactions between the producers and consumers of media texts, giving 
climate change different meanings in different places at different times. This context-specific 
making and re-making of climate change meaning has been described as a ͚ĐŝƌĐƵŝƚ of culture' 
38, which contrasts with the globalized visions of climate change that have percolated into 
society from climate science39. In the decade since this ƉĂƉĞƌ͛Ɛ publication, the cultural 
circuit of media communications about climate change has changed dramatically. As well as 
the shift from the abstract/scientific to the material/political, the structures within which 
meaning-making takes place have changed, with the dominance of mainstream media being 
eroded by interactive, social media.  
Social media 
Whilst climate issues still feature in the mainstream media, the online environment has 
provided a new and expanding arena for such discussions. Climate scientists have taken to 
blogs, Twitter and other social media platforms to enter into dialogue with a diverse range 
of actors including colleagues in their own professional communities, political activists, and 
͚lay͛ publics 40, 41. This has opened up new areas of research around the role of the internet 
in efforts to engage with multiple audiences and evaluate how different stakeholders 
participate in online debates42.  
One of the first applied linguists to study blogs in the context of climate change 
communication was Koteyko 43.  She argues that for scholars interested in studying the 
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conceptualizations of climate change, blog discussions provide a rich source of data due to 
their relative spontaneity, interactivity, and multiple possibilities for content creation, 
enabling a large number of voices that can be analysed almost in real time. Here the internet 
is viewed as a rhetorical context providing publics with the opportunity to engage with 
developments in science and policy, and contest elite messages 44. Koteyko et al. 45 further 
demonstrate how climate change communication scholars can systematically retrieve data 
from blogs and apply text analysis and data visualisation tools to establish both macro- and 
micro-patterns of language use by different discourse communities., For example, US states 
with Republican voting patterns have been found to be more likely to originate Twitter 
comments using the term ͚ŐůŽďĂů ǁĂƌŵŝŶŐ͛ and frame it as a ͚ŚŽĂǆ͛ than were states with a 
preponderance of Democrat voters, where the term ͚ĐůŝŵĂƚĞ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ͛ was more apt to be 
used and was framed as a real problem requiring attention46.  
Discussions on blogs platforms enable spaces for rhetorical invention which can foster 
discussion, reveal instances of contestation and help generate alternative networks of 
scientific knowledge production. Blogs were a key influence on newspapers in the creation 
of media hype around Climategate, both in terms of the level of attention afforded to the 
controversy and the type of language being used47.  Sharman 48 critically examines the 
climate skeptical blogosphere investigating whether a focus on particular themes 
contributes to the positioning of the most central blogs. More recently, a large-scale analysis 
of the English-language blogosphere combined content analysis of topics with study of the 
network structure 49. Moving beyond the polarized view of climate change debate, the 
authors examined nuanced differences between skeptics and accepter communities on the 
blogs and identify one large community of sceptics and several climate change accepter 
communities. Meanwhile, Matthews 50 provides a useful insight into the reasoning of those 
who publicly question climate science on blogs. Furthermore, comments left underneath 
blogs or online newspaper articles provide insights into the meanings given to climate 
change by readers beyond elite media discourses 11, 51. This pluralisation of meanings is 
consistent with climate ĐŚĂŶŐĞ͛Ɛ shift from the scientific to the political, but also poses a 
challenge for ͚ŵŽĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͛ between individuals approaching the issue from different cultural 
and political perspectives52. This highlights the importance of both the dynamics and 
contexts for online participation in climate change discussions, and the complex interplay 
between the social, instrumental, and technological determinants of participation 53. 
Perhaps as a reaction to the increasing role of politics in discussions about climate change 
there have come calls for increased communication from scientists 40, who have often been 
peripheral figures in online debates about climate science and climate politics 54. Schäfer 
emphasizes that increasing the number of stakeholders involved in online discussions has 
not improved the robustness of scientific information available or the quality of the debates, 
although also noting that ͞ŝŵƉĂĐƚƐ on the broader public seem to be limited so far͟54. A 
small number of climate scientists have used blogs to communicate a variety of aspects of 
knowledge which are less evident in formal scientific publications for a number of years 55. 
Recent studies suggest that the number of climate scientists participating in social media 
conversations is also beginning to increase. For example, an analysis of postings on Twitter 
around the publication of the /W͛Ɛ report into the physical science basis of climate change 
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(Assessment Report 5, Working Group 1) showed physical scientists and social scientists 
participating in conversations with journalists, activists, NGOs and members of the public 56. 
The analysis coded conversation participants on Twitter according to whether or not they 
expressed support for the IPCC, and found that the densest network of conversational 
connections occurred between individuals in the UK and Europe with contesting views. A 
study of Twitter messages containing generic hashtags about climate change57 found some 
similar ͞ŽƉĞŶ ĨŽƌƵŵƐ͟ of contestation, but concluded that discussions were more likely to 
take place within more homogenous enclaves of opinion. The authors conclude that 
͞KǀĞƌĂůů͕ social media discussions of climate change often occur within polarized 'echo 
chambers͛͘͟ Such studies suggest that it is possible for online communities to contribute 
both to bipartisan engagement as well as enabling polarization. However, quantitative ͚ďŝŐ 
ĚĂƚĂ͛ analysis needs to be treated with caution, as it can become abstracted and divorced 
from key contexts which give social media postings their meaning(s) 58.  For social media 
analysis to realize its full potential, quantitative analysis must be undertaken in tandem with 
qualitative, ethnographic analysis of social media postings and interactions. Notwithstanding 
these methodological observations, in the next section we consider some attempts to 
explore the psychosocial and cultural factors that may influence perceptions and 
communication of climate change.  
 
Psychology, politics and practice 
Climate change communication researchers, psychologists in particular, have begun to study 
the wide spectrum of voices and views in the climate change debate. Whilst many 
participants are broadly aligned with the position espoused by the IPCC, there are others 
who consider the impending changes are likely to be more catastrophic and immediate, and 
some who whole-heartedly reject the idea of anthropogenic climate change. Equally, it is 
possible to find constituencies endorsing climate change policies, mainly focusing on 
mitigation, whereas others reject such policies but sometimes endorse adaptation 
measures48, 59. Such plurality of views have prompted contrasting strands of applied 
research, focusing either on dispelling climate change ͚ŵǇƚŚƐ͛ 60 or trying to create a space 
for a more open dialogue in which various voices and opinions can participate61, 62. In the 
following we shall first summarise some aspects of the psychological and historical efforts 
being made to gain insights into changes in climate change communication and then go on 
to detail some more applied efforts at climate change communication informed by such 
studies and other survey-based approaches. 
Within research programmes focused on psychological issues, efforts are made to 
understand the political and cultural roots of diverse attitudes to climate change.  Several 
recent studies focus on message content and cognitive and attitudinal variables to provide 
insights into climate change communication. Bain et al.63 found that, in the U.S., those 
skeptical of anthropogenic climate change were more likely to support environmental 
actions if these were justified in terms of economic benefits or making people more 
considerate of one another. Focus on hope and potential solutions can be more effective in 
inducing support for mitigation policies if the audience is initially skeptical64. Messages 
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focusing on technical solutions promote less polarization in recipients.  Messages focusing 
on fear and predictions of adverse events can increase skepticism, perhaps because they 
disrupt underlying ͚ũƵƐƚ ǁŽƌůĚ͛ beliefs, and can reduce ƉĞŽƉůĞ͛Ɛ intentions to perform 
mitigating actions65. A U.S. study66 suggests that news about potential adverse effects may 
motivate liberals towards mitigating actions action but may make conservatives more 
skeptical.  
These studies suggest that there is no single message that will appeal to all political 
persuasions. Neither is it simply a matter of providing people with scientific information: in 
the U.S., conservative skeptics may be well informed 64 and scientifically literate 67. To 
address these kinds of complexities some authors have attempted to condense and 
summarize the findings and produce what one may call ͚ďĞƐƚ practice ŐƵŝĚĞƐ͛͘ One of the 
best-known of these guides showed that ͞ŝŶ order for climate science information to be fully 
absorbed by audiences, it must be actively communicated with appropriate language, 
metaphor, and analogy; combined with narrative storytelling; made vivid through visual 
imagery and experiential scenarios; balanced with scientific information; and delivered by 
trusted messengers in group settings͟ 68. Such strategic climate change communication 
relies not only on psychological studies but also on increasingly sophisticated opinion polls69. 
Such research is applied ͚ŝŶ the ĨŝĞůĚ͛ by outreach organizations such as Climate 
Communication in the US who aim to make science ͞ŚĞĂrd and ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ͟70, and the 
Climate Outreach and Information Network (COIN)71 and the Talking Climate 72 website in 
the UK. The latter is novel in providing a bridge between climate change communication 
academics and practitioners, providing updates on the latest academic research and 
considering how this should inform practice.  
Much applied work focuses on finding the most effective means by which climate science 
communicators can persuade the public of the importance of climate change. Discovering 
such means is believed to lie in a greater understanding of the affective, cognitive and 
attitudinal variables that provide cues for effective communication. An example of such an 
endeavor is the Time for Change? 19 report on climate change communication, a 
collaboration between climate scientists, policy analysts and Science and Technology Studies 
scholars. The report focuses on the role of climate scientists in contributing to public and 
policy discourse and decision-making on climate change. It recommends the establishment 
of a ͞ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů body for climate scientists ΀͙΁ to provide a unifying purpose and to offer 
ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ͘͟ It also advocates training for climate scientists in how to engage in 
communication more transparently and to ideally see it is as an opportunity for ͚ĐŽ-
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ͛͘ The authors commend that ͞΀Ă΁ĐƚŝǀĞ critical self-reflection and humility when 
interacting with others should become the cultural norm on the part of all participants in the 
climate ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ͘͟ The report places the onus of communicating ͚ƉŽůŝĐǇ-ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ͛ climate 
science on the shoulders of the scientists themselves, a potentially risky strategy as 
communication efforts coming from those perceived by some to be ͚ĂŶ interested ƉĂƌƚǇ͛73 
might not necessarily be well received. However, this seems likely to be a problem to be 
dealt with rather than avoided; climate science is entangled with multiple ideas about how 
our societies may look in the future so has inevitably become a site of politics and 
constestation 74, 75. Perhaps more problematic is the report͛Ɛ call for a climate science ͚ŵĞƚĂ-
ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ͕͛ echoing calls elsewhere for scientists to ͞ƐƉĞĂŬ with one ǀŽŝĐĞ͟76. As we argue in 
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the next section, attempts to formulate a unified narrative are unlikely to yield a solution to 
climate change communication dilemmas.  
Consensus messaging 
An increasingly prominent example of a unified climate communication message, involves 
the formulation and dissemination of a scientific ͚ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ͛ on anthropogenic climate 
change. We place a particular focus on consensus messaging for academic and practical 
reasons. Academically, consensus messaging marks a continuation of key assumptions 
regarding the relationship between science and public from previous science communication 
models that see the public as needing to be informed and persuaded. Practically, consensus 
messaging has become increasingly visible in recent years, with a high profile academic 
article claiming that 97.1% of academic papers expressing a position on climate change 
either explicitly state or imply that warming has taken place and has been primarily caused 
by human activities 77. The ƉĂƉĞƌ͛Ɛ authors have sought to increase the impact of their paper 
through the ͚ŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ WƌŽũĞĐƚ͛ that aims to ͞ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞ the overwhelming scientific 
agreement on anthropogenic (human-caused) global warming to the public at ůĂƌŐĞ͟ 78. 
The ͞ϵϳй͟ claim has become a climate change communication meme, inspiring a blog 79, a 
popular television comedy programme 80 and even being tweeted by President Barack 
Obama, albeit embellishing the original claim by asserting that the consensus was about 
͞ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ͟ climate change 81 .The Consensus Project is justified by the reported existence 
of a ͚ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ŐĂƉ͛ between the quantified level of consensus in the scientific literature 
and the awareness of this consensus in the general public (as measured through opinion 
polling), which is believed to constitute a ͞ƌŽĂĚďůŽĐŬ that has for two decades inhibited 
public support for climate ĂĐƚŝŽŶ͟ 82. This is an example of the classical technique of 
͚ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ from ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ͕͛ where the credibility and authority of climate science is invoked 
as a means of persuasion. Two academic papers support this approach, providing evidence 
of correlation between awareness of the scientific consensus and support for climate policy 
83, and which showed that supplying information about the 97% consensus to a sample of 
pedestrians increased their acceptance of anthropogenic global warming84. This evidence, in 
conjunction with the Consensus WƌŽũĞĐƚ͛Ɛ extensive media coverage 85 might confirm the 
value of this strategy against what some call the ͚DĞƌĐŚĂŶƚƐ of ŽƵďƚ͛86. However, evidence 
from within psychology and other disciplines suggests a note of caution. 
First, within psychology there is an argument that the 97% strategy fails to take into account 
the importance of cultural effects on assimilation of information, and that as members of 
the public take up more entrenched positions on climate change, increasing the supply of 
information about climate science may have less success 87. Second, exploring correlation 
between variables and conducting laboratory studies cannot supply definitive evidence 
about climate change communication strategies. Science communication takes place in an 
open system, where competing messages exist. Even if the merchants of doubt disappeared, 
many other concerns will continue to compete for the attention of publics, diluting the 
immediate focus placed on climate change in laboratory studies 88. Kahan 89 argues that the 
Consensus Project failed to provide significant new information about consensus in climate 
science 90-93, and that media coverage of previous consensus studies failed to increase the 
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percentage of the public who believes that humans are mostly responsible for recent 
increases in the ĂƌƚŚ͛Ɛ temperature: ͞^ƵĐŚ a strategy has already been tried in the real 
world. It ĚŝĚŶ͛ƚ work͘͟  
Third, by putting science at the front and centre of communication efforts, advocates of the 
97% strategy place science in the firing line of those who oppose particular climate policies. 
This focus on science is not restricted to climate communicators; the h<͛Ɛ Climate Change 
Act 94 states that the national target for reducing carbon emissions can only be amended 
with ͞ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ developments in scientific knowledge about climate change, or European or 
international law or ƉŽůŝĐǇ͘͟ When science, rather than democratic political engagement, 
becomes the main plank upon which policy is built, it is unsurprising that science becomes a 
target for political opponents of policy. As Demeritt 95 presciently argued, attempts to 
substitute climate science for climate politics merely prolongs the debate over whether or 
not the science is ͚ƐŽƵŶĚ͛͘ Within this context, the importance of the various ͚-ŐĂƚĞƐ͛ 
becomes apparent, as they derail science-focused communication efforts. It may be that 
climate communicators who focus on science are taking their cues from an assumption that 
scientific consensus begets political consensus 39, 75, 95. However, as well as being poorly 
founded in the evidence, such an assumption may also be damaging to attempts to address 
climate change: the causes and consequences of climate change are likely to be diverse, 
suggesting a multiplicity of ways in which problems related to climate change should be 
addressed. 
A focus upon the encomium of 97% consensus tends to restrict discussion in the public 
sphere to those areas where substantial consensus can be mustered, such as whether 
warming has taken place or the presence of an anthropogenic component. It may be more 
difficult to address the diversity of processes and mechanisms which contribute to periods of 
change or stability in climate, such as ocean processes 96,  the role of volcanic activity 97, or 
the ongoing concerns about relationships between climate models and instrumental records 
and the extent to which these differ 98. In other words, it focuses discussion on areas of high 
consensus rather than areas of complexity.  
Perhaps then, a useful direction in communication about climate is to focus not only on 
consensus but to seek to celebrate the disagreements which necessarily flow from such a 
complex multi-level issue as climate change 99. Such an overtly political approach to climate 
change communication accepts both that hard-to-overcome cultural barriers exist in talking 
about many aspects of climate change (including climate science), and that dialogue which is 
inclusive of human values provides greater promise than top-down efforts at science 
education87. Recent reports aimed at practitioners of science communication have offered 
advice on knitting together both values and scientific knowledge100, 101 with an 
understanding of the importance of ͞ƉƵƚ΀ƚŝŶŐ΁ yourself in the ĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞ͛Ɛ ƐŚŽĞƐ͟102.  Experts 
tend to see the public as having a limited grasp of uncertainty ʹ hence the appeal of 
͚ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ͛ - but there are many examples of phenomena where laypeople think effectively 
about uncertainties, such as in sport or gambling 103.  
Climate change communication and the deficit trap 
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It is worth pausing at this point to reflect further on the kind of models of science and the 
public implied in many of the efforts described above to inform and persuade the public. 
Like the older ͚ĚĞĨŝĐŝƚ͛ models of science communication, there is an underlying assumption 
that the public is somehow lacking in knowledge or is insufficiently aware of impending 
dangers. In this view the job of the scientist or science communicator is to persuade the 
public into alignment with the kind of consensus promoted by the Consensus Project 77, 82. 
This model of the public as deficient and as a body that needs to be educated and persuaded 
underlies a great deal of advice about climate communication. This is what we might 
describe as the traditional paradigm of science communication which itself is founded on the 
deficit model of public understanding of science 104.  
For example, in a short but spirited article Hassol 105 describes several such techniques 
whereby scientists can communicate in terms akin to those understood by putative 
members of the public, including metaphors and simple story telling.  This focus on telling 
stories in simple terms and repeating simple messages is pursued further by Somerville and 
Hassol 106 and also combined with consensus messaging. Whilst this project is ongoing, as we 
have noted before, scientific communication is about rather more than simply well-chosen 
metaphors or stories judged sufficiently simple for the public to assimilate 107. As Wynne108 
notes, these themselves can be read back to disclose how scientists conceive of the public. 
Indeed, this preoccupation with finding the language of the common man or woman as a 
vehicle of public engagement is perhaps the latest manifestation of the older concern that 
the public is somehow deficient in knowledge 109. 
According to this view, alignment between the public and the putative scientific consensus 
will be enhanced if more colloquial language is adopted, recognizing the variations in 
meaning across social groups. Once again, however, in this view, the scientific framing of the 
issue and the ƉƵďůŝĐ͛Ɛ ignorance is taken for granted and the stage is set for the kind of 
manipulation of publics to a scientific agenda described by Cooke and Kothari 110. Instead, 
argue Felt and Wynne111, it might be possible to conceive of a different model of 
communication and engagement which allows a more dynamic relationship to develop and 
enables participants to ͚ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ entrenched assumptions, interests, power-structures and 
ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ͛ and more fully cognizant of the capabilities of people to deliberate, discuss 
and deduce solutions independent of interventions from experts and governments. Such a 
model runs contrary to the assumptions of the old public understanding of science model 
which are encoded in the Consensus Project and the work of Hassol: the public as a body in 
need of enlightenment and persuasion by ͚ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ͛. This, as Felt and Wynne111 describe, 
suggests that ͞interest seems focused on new procedures more to justify established 
imaginations and commitments, and to procure ͚trust͛ for what remain essentially 
unchanged imaginations, habits-of-thought and decision-making processes͟. It reflects 
͞persistently technocratic, reductionist and exclusive functioning of the underlying 
governance culture itself͟. Felt and Wynne remain optimistic that a more effective and 
creative dialogue is possible, with the recognition that science and government are part of 
the very societies they seek to control. The response is to focus on ͚͞opening up͛ the ways in 
which the ͚answers͛ depend on the ͚questions͛ and the framing of ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ͙΀ƚŽ΁ facilitate the 
nurturing and maturing of more open and diversely creative discursive spaces on the roles 
and purposes of science in governance͟112.  
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Many studies reviewed here are rooted in ͚ǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ of effective climate change 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ͛ which draw on such communication maxims as the importance of engaging 
people emotionally, carefully defining communication goals and knowing ŽŶĞ͛Ɛ audiences. 
Even where dialogue is advocated, this is often formulated in an expert-informed manner 
and experts are the arbiters of reality. As we have described, and as critics of simple public 
understanding of science models such as Wynne 113 have pointed out, there often exists in 
these approaches an implicit model of the audience which may not be subject to empirical 
scrutiny ʹ a kind of expert ͚ĨŽůŬ ŵŽĚĞů͛103 - and which may assume from the outset a degree 
of ignorance or deficit. We argue that this is a poor perspective from which to undertake 
dialogue, a position supported by a first-hand account from three climate scientists active on 
social media: ͞ŽŶůŝŶĞ conversations can be unpredictable, rambunctious and frustrating, 
they are often personally and professionally rewarding ͙ conversations are more successful 
than ůĞƐƐŽŶƐ͟40. 
 
Sidebar title: Communicating uncertainty and localizing climate change communication 
One of the most pressing issues is how scientists and communicators address the question 
of uncertainty and complexity. Climate scientists, climate communicators and social 
scientists are beginning to debate uncertainty and complexity more openly. These activities 
need to continue alongside consensus messages, as only in this way suspicions that linger 
about the scientific process can be overcome. Alongside such activities, more local climate 
change communication activities are necessary, as it is at the local rather than the global one 
that scientific uncertainties, especially about risks and impacts, persist and have to be 
discussed openly and honestly. 
Sidebar title: Rethinking ͚ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ͛͗ lessons from 2010 
A key finding of our 2010 review was that much of the literature sought to present ͞ǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ 
of effective climate change ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ͟ based on assessments of communication 
audience, style and goals. We also found that finding the right words, metaphors and 
strategies with which to communicate is necessary, but insufficient for good public 
engagement. These findings remain valid today and in light of our review of more recent 
climate change communication literature. 
Communication does not exist in a vacuum: audiences hold particular values and views 
which will influence their interpretation of new information. Rather than assuming such 
influences to be nefarious and in need of correction, we identified the importance of two-
way dialogue and lively debate as inherent to productive deliberation about possible futures 
in a changing climate. The implication of this finding for future research is that studies of 
climate communication ͚ŝŶ the ĨŝĞůĚ͛ should be given greater weight than laboratory-based 
studies aimed at behaviour change.  
 
Four Future Directions  
12 
 
Anticipating future challenges and developments in dialogues about the ǁŽƌůĚ͛Ɛ climate is as 
difficult as predicting the climate itself. Nevertheless it is possible to point to four future 
directions for climate change communication research and practice.  
First, one of the most pressing issues is how scientists and communicators address the 
question of uncertainty and complexity114. Echoing Somerville and ,ĂƐƐŽů͛Ɛ106 enthusiasm for 
simple messages, sometimes experts are wary of including complexity and uncertainty in 
public discussions of climate change. Such a view is also expressed by some journalists, such 
as James Randerson speaking to the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee  
where he expresses concern about the possibility that doubt might be sown and the risks of 
͚ƉůĂǇŝŶŐ up uŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŝĞƐ͛115. Yet as Wynne 116 reminds us, and as some climate scientists are 
beginning to advocate themselves117, indeterminacy is a central part of human inquiry. 
Indeed, many of the key parameters in climate change, like temperature records, climate 
sensitivity values or ocean heat content estimates are complex human constructions in 
terms of how they are assembled, what they mean and their political trajectories as they are 
used by scientists and other interest groups. Rather than simply being objects of scientific 
discovery, these might best be seen as ͞epistemologically and indeed ethically complex, 
strictly indeterminate, heuristics͟116. This is not to undermine the case for action, but rather 
to advocate a richer understanding of human processes in discovery, dissemination and 
political decision making than is often found at present.  
There is also a practical benefit to addressing uncertainty. At the moment, a curious 
individual browsing the internet for information on topics such as the degree of uncertainty 
attached to environmental measurements, the role of adjustments and missing data in 
temperature records or comparing present day weather events with those of the past, are 
likely to encounter people skeptical of mainstream scientific claims on these issues. This 
means that robust and persuasive accounts of the processes involved in creating data sets 
and the measures of uncertainty attached to these would be a valuable part of the argument 
from the point of view of those seeking to deploy these factors in public discussion. Many 
key variables are complex assemblages inferred from a variety of primary data sources and 
are, as Wynne reminds us, epistemologically and ethically complex too116.  
Second, as well as emotionally charged predictions of dramatic change, it is important to 
find a way of talking about relatively gradual processes or periods of stability. For example, 
predictions of comparatively modest change in temperatures over the next few years are 
arising from a variety of sources such as the UK Met KĨĨŝĐĞ͛Ɛ decadal forecasts and from 
studies of ocean processes118. Similarly, the so called ͚ƉĂƵƐĞ͛ or ͚ŚŝĂƚƵƐ͛ in temperature rise 
in recent years has prompted discussion in both lay and academic circles. One 
communication strategy is exemplified by Michael Mann in Scientific American119, namely to 
describe this as a ͚ĨĂƵǆ ƉĂƵƐĞ͛ and reaffirm predictions of accelerated and dangerous 
warming in the near future. Some concerned commentators have even suggested that 
discussing the ͚ƉĂƵƐĞ͛ represents a hazardous ͚ƐĞĞƉĂŐĞ͛ of climate ƐĐĞƉƚŝĐƐ͛ agendas into the 
academic sphere120. Yet this is only part of the story. Rather than being a distraction from 
the overall narrative of impending peril, discrepancies and anomalies are often integral to 
scientific observation and academic discourse121. Some climate scientists and media analysts 
have taken up the opportunity provided by the ͚ƉĂƵƐĞ͛ to encourage more diverse climate 
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change communication strategies and to encourage rather than distract from uncertainty 
communication 40, 117, 122. However, more overt engagement with them could render ͞public 
lives, public uptakes, and public engagements more resilient, and practically rewarding͟116. 
In the light of these two issues, we would like to repeat our plea for policymakers, scientists 
and communicators to look beyond simple transmission models or public understanding 
models of the relationship between expert knowledge and ͚ůĂǇ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ͛͘ These embody a 
limited view of the relationships between science and society, a limited view of the public 
and curiously truncated view also of communications research as being about finding the 
right words and checking if people have listened. They may also, as Welsh and Wynne 
caution123, actually help to create a public which is passive and apparently ill-informed. 
Studying how the competing voices of climate change are framed by various stakeholders in 
different media (from print media to Web. 2.0) can help gauge public opinions and reactions 
to the issue of climate change and its mitigation. Whereas traditional media such as 
newspapers have been extensively studied, attempts to examine the construction of climate 
mitigation issues in emergent social groups, blogs and other new media are still relatively 
uncharted territory124. These proliferating sites of debate, engagement and knowledge 
construction offer new ways of thinking about climate change and its attendant risks. They 
offer the possibility that each case can ͚ĚĞǀĞůŽƉ its own logic of ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ͛111 and new 
actors can develop their own voices and their own ways of harnessing science and 
technology. 
Third, the study of climate change communication itself can change the social landscape. 
New ways of thinking about politics, power and social structure are afforded by discussions 
of climate change 125, 126. Darier and Schüle 127 found that awareness of global environmental 
issues is always contextualized in broader perspectives and is not exclusively 'environmental' 
and may be informed by features of national cultures. Although studies of public 
perceptions cannot directly tell policy makers which specific policy initiatives could work in 
practice, they can, however, give indications of what is likely to be acceptable to citizens, 
and more importantly why or why not. 
Fourth, it is valuable to recognize that there may not be a single effective way to 
communicate about climate change to all audiences. To this end, rather than seeing the 
public as a body of people whose opinions need to be guided, there are promising areas of 
work where studies of public perceptions and commitments inform the framing of messages 
and what they should say. Using this method, a team of researchers 128 129 examined public 
understanding and perception of climate change to develop a brochure for the general 
public, which was iteratively refined via discussion with the audience. Studies of public 
perceptions 130-132 can provide evidence of what people currently know and believe about 
energy technologies, with the goal of facilitating better communication between all parties 
about the respective risks and benefits of climate change. Lorenzoni and Hulme 133 discussed 
several future scenarios with participants and elicited a desire on the part of their 
informants to see more information about how the predictions were derived and the kinds 
of evidence they were based upon, also uncovering questions of trust and a wish to explore 
the shorter-term local impact of possible changes. Such findings chime with our earlier plea 
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for more effective engagement with the detailed processes of how measures and 
predictions are compiled and arrived at.  
Conclusion 
In summary, rather than seeing the audience as in need of instruction from expert 
communicators, maybe the best way forward is to grasp the possibilities offered by a more 
inclusive model of the policymaking process. Rather than being passive recipients of 
communication designed to ensure that they are ͚ŽŶ ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ͕͛ once people become 
collectively engaged with a task that they have a realistic chance of solving, they can, acquire 
knowledge and technologies themselves. This process has been theorized through the 
notion of discursive or deliberative democracy 134, 135 and through the notion that 
technologies change social relationships and that these in turn modify the technologies136. 
More radically, it may be that we should actively embrace sources of dissensus, rather than 
consensus, as they provide a fruitful means of reaching decisions within democratic societies 
99. Such sources of dissensus are likely to include deeply rooted cultural and political values67, 
100, 102 which are unlikely to be reconcilable, but must be treated seriously and as legitimate 
within a properly functioning democracy137. A lively debate with acknowledgement of 
difference and uncertainty can best be understood not as a failure of consensus or a 
deficiency of knowledge but as a means of ͚ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ public engagement with science 
authentically alive and not under the control of agents whose own culturally embedded 
assumptions, imaginations and practices may well be part of the ƉƌŽďůĞŵ͛111.  
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